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VIOLENCE IMPLICIT IN HIJAB SUPPRESSION LAWS IN 
UZBEKISTAN, TAJIKISTAN, AND FRANCE UNDER THE 
CEDAW FRAMEWORK 
Jordan Elizabeth Pahl† 
Abstract: This Comment examines three instances of laws banning hijab, the 
headscarf worn by many Muslim women. These laws, as enacted in Soviet Uzbekistan, 
France, and Tajikistan provide justifications for violence against women on a number of 
levels and, as such, violate the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The stigmatization of Muslim women these 
laws perpetuate result in women’s lack of access to work and education as guaranteed by 
CEDAW, and also act as a catalyst for violence against women who violate these laws. 
This paper argues that hijab suppression laws violate CEDAW on a number of levels; not 
only do these laws result in Muslim women’s disparate access to education and work, but 
also have the effect of justifying and perpetuating violence against women. 
Cite as: Jordan Pahl, Violence Implicit in Hijab Suppression Laws in Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, and France Under the CEDAW Framework, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 727 (2019). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The three countries examined in this Comment each enacted laws and 
policies banning the hijab, the headscarf worn by many Muslim women. 
While one may be forgiven for thinking these kinds of policies rose to 
prominence after the attacks on September 11, 2001, a quick dive into the 
historical record suggests otherwise; not only is singling out Muslim women 
not new, it has been, in fact, quite common historically.1 This Comment 
specifically investigates three such instances: the Uzbek Soviet Socialist 
Republic in the mid-twentieth century, France beginning in the 1980s, and 
modern-day Tajikistan. Demonstrably different in both text and context, these 
laws and policies took different shapes, occurred at different times in history, 
and purported to serve different purposes. But all these laws achieved similar 
results: the exclusion of women whose religion calls for them to wear 
 
†  Jordan Elizabeth Pahl is a dual J.D. and M.P.A. Candidate at the University of Washington’s School 
of Law and Daniel J. Evans School of Public Policy and Governance, expected to graduate in June 2019. She 
earned her B.A. in Middle Eastern Studies and Russian Studies from the University of Texas at Austin in 
2016. She would like to thank Renée Giovarelli for guidance on this topic, and Professor Mary Fan for her 
review.  
1  See generally FRANTZ FANON, A DYING COLONIALISM (1965) (describing the efforts of the French 
to de-veil Algerian women). 
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headscarves from public life, women forced to choose between their faith and 
society, and violence against women perceived as Muslim. 
A headscarf ban does not neatly fit under the five classically proffered 
justifications for criminal punishment—“incapacitation, retribution, general 
deterrence, specific deterrence, and rehabilitation.”2 Some of the laws 
examined here carry a justification relating to public safety and terrorism.3 
Some invoke long-standing, deeply held religious or cultural traditions.4 All 
of these anti-hijab laws, however, share one consequence: stoking public 
animosity against Muslim women.5 This Comment argues that headscarf bans 
stigmatize and potentially even stoke violence as a form of discrimination 
against women.6 
In seeking to relate discrimination and violence against women, this 
Comment uses as a legal framework the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”). CEDAW was adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979 and has since been ratified 
by 189 states.7 While not included in the original text, the authoritative UN 
Committee on CEDAW has established that gender-based violence 
constitutes impermissible discrimination against women.8 Of the three 
instances of hijab suppression examined here, both Tajikistan and France 
 
2  Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified, 
42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (1990). 
3  Id. 
4  Id.; see also Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, in ON VIOLENCE 445 
(Bruce B. Lawrence & Aisha Karim eds., 2007) (noting that “[t]o find the suitable punishment for a crime is 
to find the disadvantage whose idea is such that it robs forever the idea of a crime of any attraction.”). 
5  Blecker, supra note 2, at 1150.   
6  While the following analysis discusses only the consequences of headscarf bans, it is important to 
note that the analysis can be almost perfectly applied to headscarf requirements as well. The issue central to 
this Comment is not actual the headscarf in particular, but rather the use of the coercive power of the state to 
enforce specific standards of dress and conduct for women in furtherance of specific national identities. See, 
e.g., Azar Nafisi, Tales of Subversion, in RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
WOMEN 257 (Courtney W. Howland, ed., 1999) (discussing the negative impact of Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
mandate that all women in Iran wear the veil). 
7  G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW]. In this paper, “CEDAW” and “the 
Convention” are used interchangeably. 
8  Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), General 
Recommendation No. 19, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add. 15 (1992) [hereinafter General 
Recommendation 19]. 
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were parties to CEDAW at the time of the examined policies. While the Uzbek 
context took place nearly fifty years before the adoption of CEDAW, the 
Convention’s structure provides a useful mechanism for analyzing the policy 
regardless. This Comment argues that hijab suppression laws violate CEDAW 
on a number of levels; not only do these laws result in Muslim women’s 
disparate access to education9 and work,10 but also have the effect of justifying 
and perpetuating violence against women.11 
II. FRAMEWORKS 
In order to argue that hijab suppression laws and policies constitute 
violence and discrimination against Muslim women under relevant 
international law, a few terms must be defined to establish the parameters of 
this discussion. The following section defines the types of Islamic dress 
relevant to the policies analyzed in this Comment, provides a background on 
the CEDAW and its progeny as an international legal framework for analyzing 
violence against women, and, finally, attempts to provide a relevant definition 
of violence itself. 
A. Hijab 
First, the term hijab is a broad one, carrying different connotations 
depending on the region, sect, and individual. The Oxford English Dictionary 
of Islam defines hijab as “[t]raditional Muslim women’s head, face, or body 
covering, of numerous . . . often referred to as the ‘veil.’”12 Generally in the 
West, the term hijab colloquially means a scarf tied around a woman’s head, 
under her chin, concealing all or most of her hair,13 although the precise 
method of tying differs by region.14 However, for the purposes of this paper, 
 
9  CEDAW, supra note 7, at art. 10. 
10  CEDAW, supra note 7, at art. 11. 
11  General Recommendation 19, supra note 8. 
12  Hijab, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM (John L. Esposito ed., 2003). 
13  For explanations of different kinds of headcoverings and their relationships to stigma in the West, 
see generally Jim A.C. Everett et al., Covered in Stigma? The Impact of Differing Levels of Islamic Head-
Covering on Explicit and Implicit Biases Toward Muslim Women, 45 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 90 (2015). 
14  See, e.g., FAEGHEH SHIRAZI, THE VEIL UNVEILED 8–9 (2001) (noting that “[o]nce the veil is no 
longer perceived as a mere piece of cloth, a cultural or religious artifact, it quickly takes on semantic 
dimensions that can be fathomed only if we clearly define the parameters of our discourse . . . . Once the veil 
is assigned a certain meaning, the veil itself acquires the power to dictate certain outcomes—the garment 
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the word hijab is used to refer to Islamic headcoverings for women generally, 
where, when a more specific garment is referenced—such as the burqa or the 
Central Asian paranja—that garment will be identified and defined 
specifically.15 Additionally, the section of the paper regarding Tajikistan 
makes a distinction between hijab and traditional Tajik headcoverings, in 
which the scarf is tied under the back of the head rather than under the chin.16 
B. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
Second, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW” or “the Convention”) provides a 
legal framework under which this Comment examines women’s dress 
restrictions and those restrictions’ relationship to violence. CEDAW was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979.17 It defines discrimination 
against women as follows: “[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made 
on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital 
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field.”18  
Article 17 of the Convention establishes the CEDAW Committee, 
which, under Article 21, is empowered to “make suggestions and general 
recommendations based on the examination of reports and information 
received from the States Parties.”19 These recommendations allow the 
committee to suggest how states can implement the treaty, as well as 
clarifying states’ obligations pursuant to the Convention.20 However, these 
 
becomes a force in and of itself, and this force must be deferred to by many people. When the semantics of 
the veil are defined, they set a dynamic of the veil in motion that dictates context.”). 
15  See Appendix 1 for a primer on the different kinds of Islamic coverings for women. 
16  See Appendix 2 for a visual distinction between Islamic headcoverings worn by Tajik women with 
traditional Tajik headcoverings that predate Islam in the region. However, I must note again that these 
characterizations are broad generalizations, and that customs and preferences vary person-to-person. 
17  See CEDAW, supra note 7. 
18  Id. at art. 1. 
19  Id. at art. 21(1). 
20  General Recommendations, LSE CENTRE FOR WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY, http://blogs.lse.ac.  
uk/vaw/int/cedaw/ general-recommendations/. [Date or last visited].  
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general recommendations are not legally binding, but rather are “considered 
authoritative statements on the content of legal duties assumed by states 
parties.”21 
 Four particular sections of CEDAW are most relevant for the following 
analysis: Article 10, Article 11, General Recommendation 12, and General 
Recommendation 19. Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention focus on equality 
of access. Article 10 requires that states “take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women in order to ensure to them equal rights 
with men in the field of education . . . .”22 Article 11, similarly, mandates that 
“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, the same rights.”23 Both provisions continue on 
to list specific situations in which these considerations are especially 
important, such as scholarships and grants,24 drop-out rates,25 the right to 
social security,26 and dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or maternity 
leave.27 
Ten years after CEDAW’s initial adoption in 1979, the CEDAW 
Committee adopted General Recommendation 12.28 The original text of 
CEDAW requires that States submit reports to the Committee regarding their 
progress with respect to discrimination against women.29 General 
Recommendation 12 recommended that states include information on steps 
taken to eradicate violence against women, a topic not explicitly addressed in 
the original text of CEDAW.30 
General Recommendation 19 followed just three years later, in 1992.31 
Whereas General Recommendation 12 merely suggested that states provide 
 
21  Id. 
22  Id. at art. 10. 
23  Id. at art. 11. 
24  Id. at art. 10(d). 
25  Id. at 10(f). 
26  Id. at 11(1)(e). 
27  Id. at 11(2)(a). 
28  Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), General 
Recommendation No. 12, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/44/38 (1989) [hereinafter General Recommendation 12]. 
29  CEDAW, supra note 7, at art. 18(1)(b). 
30  General Recommendation 12, supra note 28, at 1–4. 
31  General Recommendation 19, supra note 8. 
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more information on the issue of violence against women, General 
Recommendation 19 specifically establishes that gender-based violence in 
fact constitutes a form of discrimination against women under the 
Convention.32 The Recommendation specified that the definition of gender-
based violence “includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or 
suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. 
Gender-based violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, 
regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention violence.”33 The 
Recommendation clarifies that, while the Convention specifically applies to 
violence committed by public authorities, the Convention also requires states 
to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
by any person, organization or enterprise,” and, therefore, holds states 
“responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent 
violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for 
providing compensation.”34 Recommendation 19 examines several articles of 
the original text of CEDAW through a lens of violence, articulating how 
female subordination,35 discrimination in employment,36 and family 
relationships37 may have implications of violence against women. In 
summary, Recommendation 19 made states at least partially responsible for 
the acts of private parties. 
Following the adoption of General Recommendations 12 and 19, the 
U.N. General Assembly approved the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women (“DEVAW”) in December 1993.38 DEVAW, as 
discussed in the following section, provided a broader definition of gender-
based violence than CEDAW, and “imposed a clear, all-encompassing ‘due 
 
32  General Recommendation 12, supra note 28, at 6. See also Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the 
Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 367 n.4 (1994) 
(noting that General Recommendation 19 “was necessary to address the failure of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to mention gender violence.”). 
33  Id. 
34  General Recommendation 19, supra note 8, at 8–9. 
35  Id. at 11. 
36  Id. at 17. 
37  Id. at 23. 
38  Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter DEVAW].  
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diligence’ requirement” that “effectively eliminated the public/private 
distinction in terms of state responsibility.”39 
While CEDAW provides a useful framework for analyzing laws 
restricting Muslim women’s dress, in reality the Convention has almost no 
teeth.40 Article 29(1) requires that disputes between states regarding CEDAW 
must be submitted to arbitration, and may be sent to the International Court of 
Justice if the states cannot reach an agreement.41 However, Article 29(2) 
allows for states to “declare that it does not consider itself bound” by 29.1.42 
Almost sixty countries retain some sort of reservation with the Convention,43 
and, of those, nearly forty have opted out of 29.1.44 Regardless, CEDAW took 
great strides to move the conversation regarding international women’s rights 
forward, but it is difficult to quantify the impact CEDAW and other state 
efforts to reduce violence against women have actually achieved.45 There is 
still much to be done in the arena, especially as those rights relate to religion 
and religious expression.46 
 
39  Mary Pat Treuthart, “No Woman, No Cry” - Ending the War on Women Worldwide and the 
International Violence Against Women Act (I-Vawa), 33 B.U. INT'L L.J. 73, 88 (2015) (providing an extensive 
overview of the international law mechanisms employed to address violence against women). 
40  Notwithstanding the opt-out provisions of the treaty, as a general and historical matter, political 
scientist Chandra Muzaffar notes that “[t]he UN, it is apparent, has been able to coax and cajole, even 
persuade and pressurize human rights transgressions. But it is in no position to transform the circumstances 
and structures that are responsible for the transgressions.” Human Rights and the New World Order, in ON 
VIOLENCE 319 (Bruce B. Lawrence & Aisha Karim eds., 2007). 
41  CEDAW, supra note 7, at art. 21(1). 
42  CEDAW, supra note 7. 
43  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a reservation as “a unilateral statement, 
however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a 
treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their 
application to that State…” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2.1(d), [opened for signature 
May 23, 1969] 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
44  Declarations, reservations, objections and notifications of withdrawal of reservations relating to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/SP/2006/2. 
45  Neil A. Englehart, Cedaw and Gender Violence: An Empirical Assessment, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
265, 270 (2014) (noting that empirical obstacles to making a determination on this question are substantial, 
including that “[c]ross-national data is likely to be confounded by differing definitions of violence against 
women used in different jurisdictions and by differences in rates of reporting that are linked to cultural 
stigmas, trust in police and other government institutions, and a host of other factors.”). 
46  Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie, Women’s Equal Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: An Important But 
Neglected Subject, in RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 117 (Courtney 
W. Howland, ed., 1999) (recommending further study both inside and outside of the U.N. into “the following 
three subject areas: first, the discrimination against women attributable specifically to their status as women 
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C. Violence 
 Finally, in order to engage in an analysis of anti-hijab policies and their 
relationship to violence, parameters for the term “violence” must be 
established. For the purposes of this Comment, two general sources of 
definition are relevant: law and philosophy. 
 As mentioned in the previous section, while CEDAW General 
Recommendation 12 and 19 addressed gender-based violence, neither 
provided a particularly comprehensive definition of the term. General 
Recommendation 12 simply provides that violence against women in 
everyday life might include “sexual violence, abuses in the family, sexual 
harassment at the work place etc.”47 General Recommendation 19, however, 
provides a more sweeping definition of violence: “violence that is directed 
against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women 
disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm 
or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.”48 
The most comprehensive definition of gender-based violence from the 
international law standpoint came three years after General Recommendation 
19, with the adoption by the United Nations of DEVAW.49 Article 2 of 
DEVAW defines violence against women as including but not limited to:  
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the 
family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in 
the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female 
genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to 
 
within religions and beliefs; second, the types of coercion that impair women’s inner freedom of religion or 
belief (forum internum); and third, the types of restrictions existing on women’s outer freedom of religion or 
belief (forum externum).”). For further discussion on the background of CEDAW and its impact on violence 
against women, see Kate Rose-Sender, Emerging from the Shadows: Violence Against Women and the 
Women’s Convention, in THE WOMEN’S CONVENTION TURNED 30 453 (Ingrid Westendorp ed., 2012), see 
also Christine Chinkin, Violence Against Women, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL 
FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: A COMMENTARY 443 (Marsha A. Freeman, Christine Chinkin, 
& Beate Rudolf eds., 2012). 
47  General Recommendation 12, supra note 28, at 1. 
48  General Recommendation 19, supra note 8, at 6. 
49  DEVAW, supra note 38. 
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women, non-spousal violence and violence related to 
exploitation; 
(b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within 
the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual 
harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions 
and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution; 
(c) physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or 
condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.50 
One significant distinction between the General Recommendations’ 
definitions and that of DEVAW is the use of the phrase “depravation of 
liberty” in General Recommendation 19. Whereas DEVAW focuses on 
physical, sexual, and psychological violence, General Recommendation 19 
suggests that the act of depriving a woman of her liberty may cause suffering 
sufficient to constitute gender-based violence. However, DEVAW explicitly 
includes “intimidation at work” and “violence related to exploitation” in its 
definition.51 
 How pervasive is the idea that an action taken by a state without an 
explicit element of force or violence can, in fact, constitute violence? In 
international law, the concept rarely appears,52 but in the disciplines of 
 
50  Id. 
51  DEVAW, supra note 38. 
52  As an extreme example, Hannah Arendt quotes from the judgment against Nazi leader Adolf 
Eichmann for the proposition that “the degree of responsibility increases as we draw further away from the 
man who uses the fatal instrument with his own hands.” Hannah Arendt, From Eichmann in Jerusalem: A 
Report on the Banality of Evil 91, 97, in VIOLENCE IN WAR AND PEACE: AN ANTHOLOGY (Nancy Scheper-
Hughes & Phillipe Bourgois eds., 2004) (emphasis in original, internal quotations omitted). It is important to 
note, however, that the idea that otherwise non-violent state polices that lead to violence by state or non-state 
actors is different than the international law principles aimed at preventing superior state actors from evading 
liability for violent crimes simply because they did not themselves pull the trigger. One such principle 
exemplifying the latter is command responsibility, dictating essentially that wartime commanders have a duty 
to control their subordinates in order to prevent the commission of war crimes. Stuart E. 
Hendin, Command Responsibility and Superior Orders in the Twentieth Century: A Century of Evolution, 
10 MURDOCH U. ELEC. J.L. (2003) (describing the complete modern history of command responsibility, 
noting that “[t]he concept of command responsibility is now based on the clear inference that those who 
occupy the position of superior, in a superior-subordinate relationship, are, or may be deemed to have; (a) 
the knowledge of the criminal actions of the subordinates, (b) the authority to deal with the criminal actions 
of the subordinates; and (c) the power to deal, by with punishment or prevention with the criminal acts of 
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philosophy, anthropology, and peace and conflict studies, it is quite pervasive. 
Violence “can never be understood solely in terms of its physicality—force, 
assaults, or the infliction of pain—alone. Violence also includes assaults on 
the personhood, dignity, sense of worth or value of the victim.”53 
Critically for this Comment’s analysis, Norwegian sociologist and 
peace scholar Johan Galtung asserts that three types of violence exist—direct, 
structural, and cultural—and form a “violence triangle,” in which any one of 
these forms of violence can and likely will seep into and influence the others.54 
Direct violence, most intuitively, is an act or threat of actual physical violence 
against another.55 Structural violence, in comparison, “describes social 
structures—economic, political, legal, religious, and cultural—that stop 
individuals, groups, and societies from reaching their full potential.”56 This 
kind of violence “inform[s] the study of the social machinery of oppression” 
and is “exerted systematically—that is, indirectly—by everyone who belongs 
to a certain social order.”57 Specifically, genocide, epidemic diseases, and 
human rights violations suffered by those marginalized into poverty based on 
gender, race, or any other category used as a justification for discrimination 
constitute forms of structural violence.58 Cultural violence refers to “those 
aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by 
 
subordinates.”). The former, however, suggests that policies without an element of direct violence by the 
state or state actors can have violent effects, fairly traceable to that law or policy.  
53  Nancy Scheper-Hughes & Phillipe Bourgois, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in VIOLENCE 
IN WAR AND PEACE: AN ANTHOLOGY 1, 1 (Nancy Scheper-Hughes & Phillipe Bourgois, eds., 2004). See also 
Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Sex, Culture, and Rights: A Re/conceptualization of Violence for the 
Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB. L. REV. 607, 608 (1997) (arguing that violence against women “is more 
comprehensive, expansive and extensive than the everyday variety of ‘A hit B’--be it with sex, a fist, a bat 
or a gun; be it at war, at home, at work or in the streets.”). 
54  Johan Galtung, Cultural Violence, 27 J. PEACE RES. 291, 291 (1990). See Appendix 3 for a visual 
representation of this concept. 
55  For the purposes of this paper, to avoid monotony, the terms “direct violence” and “physical 
violence” are used interchangeably to refer to the same concept. See Asher Kaufman, Thinking Beyond Direct 
Violence, 46 INT’L J. OF MIDDLE EAST STUD. 2, 441 (2014) (citing Galtung for the proposition that “direct 
violence is physically manifested, it is related to a discernible event, and it has to involve a perpetrator and a 
purpose.”). 
56  Paul Farmer, et al., Structural Violence and Clinical Medicine, 10 PLOS MED. e449, e449. 
57  Paul Farmer, An Anthropology of Structural Violence, 24 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 305, 307 
(2004). 
58  Id. See also Scheper-Hughes, supra note 53, at 2 (noting that “[t]he everyday violence of infant 
mortality, slow starvation, disease, despair, and humiliation that destroys socially marginalized humans with 
even greater frequency are usually invisible or misrecognized.” (emphasis in original)). 
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religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science 
(logic, mathematics) - that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or 
structural violence.”59 
Cultural violence often provides the excuse necessary for structural and 
direct violence to take place, by providing one faction of society with a 
reasoned excuse for despising or fearing one another. Galtung offers by way 
of explanation that: 
[Cultural and structural violence] will tend to become a self-
fulfilling prophecy: people become debased by being exploited, 
and they are exploited because they are seen as debased, 
dehumanized. When Other is not only dehumanized but has been 
successfully converted into an ‘it’, deprived of humanhood, the 
stage is set for any type of direct violence, which is then blamed 
on the victim. This is then reinforced by the category of the 
‘dangerous it’, the ‘vermin’, or ‘bacteria’ (as Hitler described the 
Jews); the ‘class enemy’ (as Stalin described the ‘kulaks’) . . . 
Extermination becomes a psychologically possible duty.60 
Galtung further cautions that “[c]ultural violence makes direct and structural 
violence look, even feel, right—or at least not wrong.”61 Frequently, “violence 
is not deviant behavior, not disapproved of, but to the contrary is defined as 
virtuous action in the service of generally applauded conventional social, 
economic, and political norm”62 and “[e]veryday violence encompasses the 
implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular 
social, economic, and political formations.”63 This type of violence constitutes 
a kind of “invisible genocide” perpetrated against youth and the poor, who are 
“perceived as ‘dangerous’ [by] . . . adults who feel murderous toward them 
and who sometimes act on those sentiments.”64 In short, this Comment relies 
 
59  Galtung, supra note 54. 
60  Id. at 298. 
61  Id. at 291. 
62  Scheper-Hughes, supra note 53, at 5. 
63  Id. at 21. 
64  Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Small Wars and Invisible Genocides, 43 SOCIAL SCIENCE & MEDICINE 889, 
892 (1996). In this article, Scheper-Hughes also notes that “[r]ecognizing the everyday violence and invisible 
genocides practiced, unblinkingly, against the class of dangerous and endangered youths—those young 
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on the following definitions: “cultural violence” refers to rhetoric which seek 
to dehumanize a group of people, “structural violence” refers to the actual 
policies, and “direct violence” refers to the actual use of physical force.65  
 Finally, it is important to note the ways in which the combination of 
structural and cultural violence have often been used as a way to exert colonial 
power over conquered peoples: “Laws and legal norms . . . [created] codes for 
behavior against which colonized individuals could be measured and, if all 
went well (from the standpoint of colonial authorities), even inculcating these 
norms among their colonial subjects to such an extent that no massive police 
force would be required.”66 Often, “the protection of women (today the ‘third-
world woman’) becomes a signifier for the establishment of a good society . . 
. which must . . . transgress mere legality, or equity of legal policy . . . . [T]he 
process also [allows] the redefinition as a crime of what had been tolerated, 
known, or adulated as ritual.”67 In these colonial cases, aspects of culture 
previously confined to the private sphere suddenly jump to the public.68 This 
idea that certain women are to be “saved” entrenches colonial powers as “the 
establisher of the good society . . . marked by the espousal of the woman as 
 
people perceived as too old to be children and too young to be citizens–is a necessary first step in improving 
the current and abysmal state of the world’s children.” Id. at 899.  
65 While these categories have been adopted as methods of analysis by some scholars, there is no 
evidence that suggests these definitions have been or will be adopted into the framework of international law. 
See, e.g., Yxta Maya Murray, Detroit Looks Toward A Massive, Unconstitutional Blight Condemnation: The 
Optics of Eminent Domain in Motor City, 23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 395, 423 (2016) (categorizing 
the official and judicial perspectives that serve as predicates to takings as forms of violence using Galtung’s 
theory), chronicles the interplay of direct, structural, and cultural violence in the pre-Civil Rights Era South 
through the life and death of James Scales; see also Andrew P. Cohen, The Lynching of James Scales: How 
the F.B.I., the DOJ, and State Authorities “Whitewashed” Racial Violence In Bledsoe County, Tennessee, 19 
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 285, 288 (2014) (“chronicl[ing] the interplay of direct, structural, and cultural violence 
in the pre-Civil Rights Era South through the life and death of James Scales” via Galtung’s framework), 
Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the 
Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 249, 269 (1993) (providing as examples of 
cultural violence perpetrated against Native peoples in Canada “the seizure of land, government suppression 
of Indian religious practice, the prohibition on the speaking of Indian languages in residential schools . . . the 
withholding from a generation of children of their very identity as First Nations people, and a related legacy 
of sexual abuse.”). 
66  Douglas Northrop, Subaltern Dialogues: Subversion and Resistance in Soviet Uzbek Family Law, 
60 SLAVIC REV. 115, 118 (2001). 
67  Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in CAN THE SUBALTERN SPEAK?: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 21, 50–51 (Rosalind Morris ed., 2010) (describing the attempts 
of the British to eradicate widow-burning practices in India during the colonial period). 
68  Id. at 51. 
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an object of protection from her own kind.”69 Colonial powers’ use of laws 
regulating cultural behavior purporting to protect women often assumes that 
the colonized women need protecting from men of their own culture, while 
redefining a “ritual . . . not . . . as patriarchy but as a crime,”70 thereby 
rendering female victims criminals. As noted post-colonial theorist Gayatri 
Spivak describes, “Between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution 
and object-formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine 
nothingness, but into a violent shuttling which is the displaced figuration of 
the ‘third-world woman’ caught between tradition and modernization, 
culturalism and development.”71 Under these theories, the goal of protecting 
women from the violence of their own colonized culture becomes a sufficient 
justification for the restriction of those women’s freedoms. 
III. CASE STUDIES: APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORKS TO DRESS 
RESTRICTIONS ON MUSLIM WOMEN IN UZBEKISTAN, FRANCE, AND 
TAJIKISTAN 
This section of the Comment provides brief descriptions of the laws and 
policies in each of the three countries analyzed. Then, those laws and policies 
are analyzed through the frameworks of CEDAW and the relevant definitions 
of violence as provided in the previous section. 
A. Background of Laws Analyzed 
1. Uzbekistan 
 Hijab suppression in Soviet Uzbekistan in the 1920s originated in the 
Uzbekistan Communist Party and the Women’s Division of the Communist 
Party in Moscow.72 The strategy behind the campaign was straightforward: 
“‘sovietize’ Central Asia by destroying traditional systems of belief and 
behavior to evoke a national identity.”73 The Soviets74 saw Islam as “a major 
 
69  Id. at 52. 
70  Id. at 56 (emphasis in original). 
71  Id. at 61. 
72  MARIANNE KAMP, THE NEW WOMEN IN UZBEKISTAN 150 (2006). 
73  SHIRAZI , supra note 14, at 147. 
74  The term “Soviet” as used in this section refers to members of the Communist Party and the Soviet 
government generally who implemented official policies in the various Soviet Socialist Republics, such as 
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binding force among the people of Central Asia and [standing] in the way of 
its ‘sovietization.’”75 The official campaign against the hijab began on 
International Women’s Day, March 8, 1927, and was called the hujum.76 
 Prior to the Russian Revolution in 1917, religious and regional leaders 
in Central Asia exercised a great deal of control over matters of family law.77 
After the Revolution, however, the new central government increasingly 
intervened into family law matters.78 In the Soviet Union, marriage and family 
relations were meant to be “free and voluntary,” but were not entirely private: 
“The Soviet family . . . is a natural foundation of social development, and 
promotes communist upbringing and mutual assistance in everyday life. It is 
a vital factor in the development and consolidation of socialist society, in the 
advance of the Soviet state to communism.”79 Because the Soviets saw the 
family unit as critical to the promulgation of communism, and because the 
woman’s role was tied to the family unit, the Soviets focused significant 
efforts on what they considered “women’s liberation.”80 The Soviets were 
determined that women—in family and public life—should not fall into 
traditional, subservient roles, but rather be working members of society.81 As 
such, they sought to eliminate traditional practices they thought inhibited 
women’s entrance into Soviet society and communism.82 These laws and 
policies were “portrayed . . . as self-evidently progressive and humane—as no 
more than the expression of modern common sense . . . New Soviet laws were 
needed to protect Uzbek women and children from the patriarchal oppression 
that dominated their everyday lives.”83  
 
Uzbekistan. This usage is distinct from other common usages of the term, which might refer to any citizen 
of the Soviet Union. 
75  SHIRAZI, supra note 14Error! Bookmark not defined., at 147. 
76  Shoshana Keller, Trapped Between State and Society: Women’s Liberation and Islam in Soviet 
Uzbekistan, 1926-1941, 10 J. WOMEN’S HISTORY 20, 24 (1998). See also ADEEB KHALID, ISLAM AFTER 
COMMUNISM: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA 75 (U.C. Press 1999). 
77  KAMP, supra note 72. 
78  See Northrop, supra note 66, at 118. 
79  FUNDAMENTALS OF SOVIET LAW 358–62 (P.S. Romashkin ed., Yuri Sdobnikov trans., 1961). 
80  See Northrop, supra note 66, at 115. 
81  See id. at 116. 
82  See id. 
83  Id. at 118–19. 
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For example, some Republics, such as Uzbekistan and Georgia, 
criminalized the coercion of women into marriage.84 Across the Soviet Union, 
the marriageable age was raised to eighteen for both men and women, with 
some exceptions.85 This contrasted with traditional practices across the 
country, where marriageable age for women in some regions was as young as 
thirteen.86 Regardless of the merits of these new family laws, the Soviet 
standards for family life varied significantly from traditional Central Asian 
practices, and mechanisms for ensuring compliance with and even awareness 
of the new laws proved challenging to implement: “The gradually introduced 
Soviet laws contradicting Sharia, such as the law banning polygyny, had been 
widely ignored; most people were unaware of new laws, and even when they 
became aware of them, there was no enforcement.”87 Soviets characterized 
Central Asian women as “secluded” and their traditions “backwards.”88 
Against this backdrop, members of the Communist Party determined that 
“mass, public unveilings would be the Party’s instrument for breaking down 
seclusion and drawing Uzbek women into public life.”89 
2. France 
 Unlike the relatively new secularism imposed in Soviet Uzbekistan, 
France’s history of secularism dates back centuries. However, its history of 
hijab suppression within its own borders began only in 1989,90 with an 
incident known as the “Headscarf Affair.”91 In September of that year, a 
headmaster in a suburb of Paris expelled three Muslim women for wearing 
headscarves.92 The decision of the headmaster was overturned less than a 
 
84  FUNDAMENTALS OF SOVIET LAW, supra note 79, at 366–67. 
85  Id. at 367. 
86  Id. 
87  KAMP, supra note 72, at 150–51. 
88  See Id. at 162–63.  
89 Id. at 165. 
90  The French imposed hijab suppression in their colonies, notably Algeria. See FANON, supra note 1. 
See also SHIRAZI, supra note 14Error! Bookmark not defined., at 148 (noting that “Moscow’s strategy of 
unveiling Uzbeki women in order to gain greater control over Uzbekistan has many parallels with France’s 
strategy of unveiling Algerian women in order to conquer Algeria. Both the French and the Soviets equated 
the veil with Islam and Islam with women’s oppression.”). 
91  Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?: Muslim 
Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 743, 754 (2006). 
92  Reuven Ziegler, The French “Headscarves Ban”: Intolerance or Necessity?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 235, 238 (2006). 
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week later, but the incident sparked immediate interest and, in the following 
nine years, the French press wrote over 1,200 articles on the controversy.93 
The enforcement in the various headscarf cases in public schools was so 
inconsistent that, at one point, the Education Ministry hired a mediator to work 
full-time on headscarf cases.94 Currently, it is estimated that between 7% and 
9% of the French population identify as Muslim—making it the second most 
widely-practiced religion in the country, behind only Christianity at 63–
66%.95 At a population of around 67 million,96 between 4.5 and 6 million 
Muslims call France home, the largest population of Muslims in Western 
Europe.97 
The law examined was enacted in 2004 in response to piecemeal 
enforcement of policies that occasionally allowed schools to ban 
headcoverings, and banned all “conspicuous religious symbols” in schools.98 
The law reads as follows: “In public elementary, middle and high schools, the 
wearing of signs or clothing which conspicuously manifest students’ religious 
affiliations is prohibited.”99 Additionally, the law conveniently describes what 
does and does not count as conspicuous: “The clothing and religious signs 
prohibited are conspicuous signs such as a large cross, a veil, or a skullcap. 
Not regarded as signs indicating religious affiliation are discreet signs, which 
can be, for example, medallions, small crosses, stars of David, hands of 
Fatima, or small Korans.”100 
 
93  Id. at 238. See also Wing, supra note 91. 
94  Wing, supra note 91, at 756. 
95  France, CIA WORLDFACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/fr.html. (last updated May 9, 2019) (Christian (overwhelmingly Roman Catholic) 63–66%, 
Muslim 7–9%, Buddhist 0.5–0.75%, Jewish 0.5–0.75%, other 0.5–1.0%, none 23–28%). 
96  Id. 
97  Kristen Walder, France: Human Rights, Religious Freedoms & a Secular Society?, 12 BUFF. 
WOMEN’S L. J. 11, 12 (2004). 
98  Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou 
de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics [Law 2004-228 
of March 15, 2004 concerning, as an application of the principle of the separation of church and state, the 
wearing of symbols or garb which show religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools],  
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190 
[hereinafter French law]. See also Wing, supra note 91, at 756. 
99  French Law, supra note 98. 
100  JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL 11 (2007). 
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While the text of the law facially applies to all belief systems, its 
application reflects that the quintessential French principles of secularism are 
not uniformly applied across religious groups.101 While facially neutral, it is 
well-established that this law in particular sought specifically to eradicate the 
hijab in schools: 
While the official purpose of the new law is to preserve the strict 
separation of church and state, to maintain 
the religious neutrality of public schools, and to uphold the long 
tradition of laïcité, the real purpose of the law is to prevent 
Muslim girls from wearing headscarves to school. The 
discussions among French politicians and the media, and the 
events leading up to the time when the law was enacted, reveal 
that the primary motivation behind the new law was the 
elimination of the Muslim hijab from public 
schools. Religious symbols like Christian crosses and Jewish 
yarmulkes were generally well-tolerated in French public 
schools until the increase of young Muslim girls wearing the 
hijab suddenly made religious garb a major national 
controversy. The new French law has a disproportionately 
negative effect on Muslim students and is an unfortunate reaction 
against France’s Muslim minority population.102 
As far back as 1789, French law established that religion may be freely 
exercised, but not to a degree that would interfere with other rights: “No one 
shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, 
provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by 
law.”103 In 1905, the law on the Separation of the Churches and State 
established France as a secular state, a principle in French called laïcité, 
 
101  Suzanne Daley & Alissa J. Rubin, French Muslims Say Veil Bans Give Cover to Bias, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/27/world/europe/muslim-frenchwomen-struggle-with-
discrimination-as-bans-on-veils-expand.html. 
102  Stefanie Walterick, The Prohibition of Muslim Headscarves from French Public Schools and 
Controversies Surrounding the Hijab in the Western World, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 251, 278 (2006). 
103  DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DES CITOYENS [DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 
AND OF CITIZENS] (1789), art. 10. 
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roughly translated as “secularity.”104 This principle is enshrined—although 
not as extensively defined—in the French Constitution, which states that: 
“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It 
shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of 
origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised on a 
decentralised basis.”105 
Culturally, this concept is pervasive: “The French consider religion to 
be a private matter, not to be expressed in public. The basic premise is that the 
protection granted to other rights is better served when the state retains its 
secular identity.”106 To the French, separation of church and state means 
protecting citizens from the influence of religion, instead of preserving an 
individual’s right to practice: 
Although the concept of laïcité defies a precise definition, it 
embodies the constitutional principle of the State’s neutrality. . . 
. Laïcité strictly calls for a state that is free from an official or 
exclusive religion; however, this freedom is commonly 
understood in France as an absence of religious expression in the 
public sphere. . . . It is often said by Frenchmen that laïcité allows 
religion only in the private sphere.107 
In seeking to hide religious differences from public life, this version of laïcité 
promotes a homogenous identity, in which “there is no possibility of a 
hyphenated ethnic/national identity—one either belongs to a group or to the 
nation. . . . [E]quality is achieved, in French political theory, by making one’s 
social, religious, ethnic, and other origins irrelevant in the public sphere; it is 
an abstract individual that one becomes a French citizen.” 108 By preventing 
 
104  Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l'État [Law of December 9, 1905 
on the Separation of the Churches and the State], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Dec. 11, 1905, p. 7205. 
105  1958 CONST. ART. 1 (FR.). 
106  Ziegler, supra note 92, at 238. 
107  Blandine Chelini-Pont, Religion in the Public Sphere: Challenges and Opportunities, 2005 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 611, 612–13 (2005). See also Arthur Kutoroff, First Amendment Versus Laïcité: Religious 
Exemptions, Religious Freedom, and Public Neutrality, 48 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247, 278 (2015) (noting that 
“the recent headscarf controversies in France illustrate a preference for public neutrality toward religion 
over religious freedom”).  
108  JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL 11-13 (2007). Scott goes on to note: 
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other identities—religious, ethnic, or otherwise—from making claims on a 
French citizen’s identity, they become exclusively French, and are less 
susceptible to “dangerous,” non-French ideas.109 Therefore, any religious 
proclivities are shunted into the private sphere, so as not to “impose” on 
others: “Laïcité means the separation of church and state through the state’s 
protection of individuals from the claims of religion. . . . To be acceptable, 
religion must be a private matter; it must not be displayed ‘conspicuously’ in 
public places, especially in schools, the place where the inculcation of 
republican ideals began.”110 
This principle is not uniformly applied by the French across various 
religious beliefs. For example, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
“referr[ed] to France as ‘the eldest daughter of the [Catholic] Church’ and 
stat[ed] that ‘the roots of France are essentially Christian,’” directly in conflict 
with the French tradition of omitting religion from the public space.111 Later, 
he endorsed the country’s proposed burqa ban, introduced in 2009, 
characterizing the burqa as a “‘sign of subversion and debasement.’”112 
3. Tajikistan 
 The history of hijab suppression in Tajikistan is a long and complicated 
one, culminating only recently in August 2017 with the formal passage of a 
law restricting Muslim women’s dress. Of the three states examined in this 
 
France insists on assimilation to a singular culture, the embrace of a shared language, history, and 
political ideology . . . that guarantee[s] all individuals equal protection by the state against the claims 
of religion and any other group demands. French universalism insists that sameness is the basis for 
equality . . . positing the sameness of all individuals, a sameness that is achieved not simply by 
swearing allegiance to the nation but by assimilating to the norms of its culture.  
Id. 
109  This strategy has been employed by the French government since the 1980s. See Karina Piser, A 
New Plan to Create an ‘Islam of France,’ THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/islam-france-macron/556604/ (noting that “the 
goal [of the government] has been to create an Islam that both conforms to national values, notably 
secularism, and is immune to the radical interpretations that have gained a footing in certain parts of the 
Muslim world.”). 
110  SCOTT, supra note 108, at 15. 
111  Peter B. Beita, French President’s religious mixing riles critics, CHRISTIAN TODAY (Jan. 23, 2008, 
1:04 PM), https://www.christiantoday.com/article/french.presidents.religious.mixing.riles.critics/16423.htm 
112  Angelique Chrisafis, Nicolas Sarkozy Says Islamic Veils Are Not Welcome in France, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 22, 2009, 2:35 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/22/islamic-veils-
sarkozy-speech-france. 
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Comment, only Tajikistan had an Islamic Party represented in its government 
at the time of the law in question’s enactment.113 The law in this case is distinct 
from the two other laws examined in this paper: the Tajik law does not, in 
fact, technically prevent women from wearing Islamic headcoverings. Rather, 
this law restricts women from wearing headcoverings that do not conform 
specifically to historic Tajik traditions.114 While the Tajik law does not seek—
expressly or impliedly—to eradicate Islam, it seeks to create a national 
identity that excludes foreign influences, manifested in a restriction on certain 
kinds of hijab deemed “un-Tajik.”115  
Secular leaders of Tajikistan have long worried about the “overspill of 
what it sees as unwelcome traditions from neighbouring Afghanistan.”116 Al 
Jazeera reports that police in the country have shaved the beards of 13,000 
people, and “closed more than 160 shops selling traditional Muslim clothing 
[in 2015] as part of the country’s fight against what it calls ‘foreign’ 
influences” and to curb radicalism.117 Similarly, in 2015, Tajik President 
Emomalii Rahmon “was upset by the appearance of several women dressed 
in long black robes traditionally worn by women in Islamic countries further 
south and west of Tajikistan.”118 As another example, in 2011, President 
 
113  For reasons described above, by virtue of the aggressively communist and therefore secular policies 
of the Soviet Union, the illegality and resulting secret nature of religion foreclosed Muslims from enjoying 
any sort of religious representation in government, with the exception of a special governing body for Islamic 
activities in the Central Asian republics. Regarding France, the Democratic Union of French Muslims sought 
candidacy in the 2017 French elections, but failed to receive the requisite 500 “sponsorships” (in which 
candidates for president must obtain signatures of elected officials) to be included in the election. Democratic 
Union for French Muslims Receives Only Three Sponsorships, EURO-ISLAM.INFO (Mar. 24, 2017), 
http://www.euro-islam.info/2017/03/24/democratic-union-french-muslims-receives-three-sponsorships/. 
114  See Appendix 2 for a visual representation. 
115  Harriet Agerholm, Tajikistan Passes Law ‘To Stop Muslim Women Wearing Hijabs’, THE 
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/tajikstan-muslim-hijabs-
stop-women-law-headscarfs-central-asia-islam-a7923886.html. 
116  Sally Peck, Tajikistan Bans Miniskirts and Headscarves, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 18, 2007), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1549005/Tajikistan-bans-miniskirts-and-head-scarves.html 
(discussing an earlier ban on the hijab specifically in public schools, citing the education minister saying, “If 
religion means more to you than studies, you should study at a religious school."). See also Tajikistan Shaves 
13,000 Beards in ‘Radicalism’ Battle, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 21, 2016), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/tajikistan-shaves-13000-men-beards-radicalism-
160120133352747.html. 
117  AL JAZEERA, supra note 116. 
118  Bruce Pannier, Central Asia’s Controversial Fashion Statements, RADIOFREEEUROPE (Apr. 1, 
2015), https://www.rferl.org/a/central-asia-fashion-islamic-risque-western-national-
mentality/26932437.html (noting also that governments of other Central Asian countries are undertaking 
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Rahmon expressed disdain for people who gave their children Arabic, rather 
than traditional Tajik names, suggesting that parents “leaf through historical 
works like Shahnameh or classic Tajik works where you will find many 
adequate, good, beautiful names.”119 At the same time the president made 
these statements, a law in the Tajik parliament could give authorities a veto 
over children’s names, which some worried would result in an effective ban 
on Muslim names.120 That law ultimately passed.121 
In August 2017, the Tajik government adopted changes to its 
preexisting law regulating “traditions, celebrations, and rituals.”122 These 
policies claim to help Tajik citizens “[avoid] waste and excess,” and included 
limitations on when marriages and funerals may occur, the performance of 
circumcision, and even what foods could be served at traditional events.123 
These policies purport “to protect the interests of the population” by forcing 
them to save money.124 The amendments also impose a duty to notify the 
relevant state department of a wedding or funeral, and to conduct it in the 
manner required by this law.125 Members of the military can be dismissed if 
 
similar policies). See also MVD Tadzhikistana usilit bor'bu s "chuzhdym" stilem odezhdy, RADIO OZODI (Mar. 
29, 2015), https://rus.ozodi.org/a/26926210.html (reporting on the Tajik Interior Ministry’s crackdown on 
“alien” styles of dress). 
119  Richard Orange, Tajik President Warns Parents of Dangers of ‘Scary Names’, THE TELEGRAPH 
(June 3, 2011), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/tajikistan/8554796/Tajik-President-
warns-parents-of-dangers-of-scary-names.html. See also David Trilling, Tajikistan Debates Ban on Arabic 
Names as Part of Crackdown on Islam, THE GUARDIAN (May 8, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/08/tajikistan-islam-arabic-names-crackdown (noting that the 
secular government of Tajikistan “fears that the country’s disenfranchised and poverty stricken villages are 
becoming recruiting grounds for militants,” and also noting, ironically, that the President’s own name derives 
from the Arabic). See also Lora Moftah, Tajikistan Muslim Name Ban: Parliament Considers Forbidding 
Arabic-Sounding Names Amid Crackdown on Islam, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 6, 2015), 
https://www.ibtimes.com/tajikistan-muslim-name-ban-parliament-considers-forbidding-arabic-sounding-
names-amid-1909880 (clarifying that, “[w]hile the bill would apply only to babies born after it is signed into 
law, there is also a growing push by parliamentarians to encourage those with Arabic-sounding names to 
change them to those that are traditionally more Tajik.”). 
120  Orange, supra note 119. 
121  AL JAZEERA, supra note 116. 
122  Menyayem traditsii i obryady. V Tadzhikistane zapretyat zabivat' skot, delat' plov na pominki i 
obrezaniye ne v bol'nitsakh, ASIA-PLUS (Aug. 11, 2017), http://news.tj/ru/node/243372 [hereinafter Tajik 
law]. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
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they or their family members are found in violation of any of these policies.126 
In regards to dress, the law provides that “persons and legal entities are 
obliged to respect the foundations of national cultures, including the official 
language and national dress, to protect them against modern negative 
influences.”127 
B. Applying the CEDAW Framework 
Despite the technical lack of enforcement abilities, CEDAW provides 
a useful framework under which laws like these hijab suppression policies can 
be analyzed. Each of the aforementioned laws, at its core, seeks to create a 
national narrative that excludes or makes invisible Muslim women. When 
analyzed under the framework of the Convention, it is clear that, while facially 
quite different, all three of these laws violate the fundamental goal of CEDAW 
of eliminating “all acts of discrimination against women by persons, 
organizations or enterprises.”128 All of these laws either explicitly or 
implicitly condition Muslim women’s access to work and education on their 
choice of religious garments, and have the effect of incentivizing other groups 
to engage in violence against Muslim women. The following two sections 
establish why a hijab ban in any of the three forms previously described 
constitutes gender discrimination based on the Convention.  
1. Disparate Access to Education and Work Under Articles 
10 and 11 
 Standards that restrict entry into employment and education for women 
specifically constitute discrimination.129 In Tajikistan, since August 2017, 
 
126  Avaz Yuldashev, V zakon ob uporyadochenii dobavili popravki dlya sluzhatshih vnutrennih voisk, 
ASIA-PLUS (Mar. 12, 2018,), http://news.tj/news/tajikistan/society/20180312/v-zakon-ob-uporyadochenii-
dobavili-popravki-dlya-sluzhatshih-vnutrennih-voisk. 
127  Kommentarii k izmeneniyam i dopolneniyam v Zakon Respubliki Tadzhikistan «Ob uporyadochenii 
traditsiy, torzhestv i obryadov v Respublike Tadzhikistan» i drugiye normativnyye pravovyye akty v plane 
uporyadocheniya traditsiy, torzhestv i obryadov [Commentary for Changes and Additions to the Law of the 
Republic of Tajikistan “On the Regulation of Traditions, Celebrations and Rituals in the Republic of 
Tajikistan’ and Other Regulatory Acts in Terms of Regulating Traditions, Celebrations and Ceremonies”], 
PREZIDENT RESPUBLIKI TAJIKISTAN (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www.president.tj/ru/node/15926. 
128  CEDAW, supra note 7. 
129  At the outset, it is important to note that Soviet Uzbekistan is not discussed much in this section, as 
education for girls actually increased under Soviet rule during the hujum. Keller, supra note 76, at 36. 
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women have worried about losing their jobs as a result of the new law: “After 
officials dropped by earlier this year and made it clear that she should not wear 
foreign attire, Manzura says, she stopped wearing the dark-colored hijab that 
covered her head and clothes for fear she would lose her license to work.”130 
Women resort to covering up more creatively, ironically wearing what an 
outside observer might assume was more western-style dress, of the kind the 
law also purports to restrict.131 As a relatively new law, its impact is not as 
well-documented, but if implementation continues on its current trajectory, 
this impact is likely to be significant. 
At the other end of the spectrum, state regulation of veils has been a 
focal point of French political discourse for several decades. In fact, state 
officials have been known to deny services to Muslim women, on the 
erroneous belief that the law actually prohibits headscarves completely.132 
While these mistaken assumptions might be decried as one-off, uncommon 
occurrences, in the realm of education and employment, the discrimination is 
explicit and codified: “Veiled woman—like anyone else wearing obvious 
signs of religious affiliation—are officially barred from working in the public 
sector because of the original laïcité laws. There is little doubt that, in practice, 
this restriction has broader impact on Muslim women who cover their 
heads.”133 Even before the school-law’s enactment, members of the human 
rights community pointed to the likelihood of its disparate impact on Muslims 
girls, despite its facial neutrality: “The impact of a ban on visible religious 
symbols, even though phrased in neutral terms, will fall disproportionately on 
Muslim girls . . . . In practice, the law will leave some Muslim families no 
choice but to remove girls from the state educational system.”134 The fact that 
this law applied facially to all conspicuous religious symbols does not change 
the fact that, as implemented and as anticipated before its passage, the policy 
 
Similarly, more women entered into the workforce. Id. This was due, however, not to unveilings, but to 
compulsory education. Soviet Uzbekistan is discussed more in the following section, as women in that 
circumstance experienced significant direct violence based on the anti-hijab policies. Id. 
130  Farangis Najibullah & Charles Recknagel, As Tajikistan Limits Islam, Does It Risk Destabilization?, 
RADIOFREEEUROPE (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-islam-destabilization-rahmon-secular-
/27400692.html 
131  Id. 
132  SCOTT, supra note 108, at 178.  
133  Daley & Rubin, supra note 109. 
134  France: Headscarf Ban Violates Religious Freedom, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 27, 2004), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/02/26/france-headscarf-ban-violates-religious-freedom. 
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constitutes discrimination against Muslim women.135 The ban, however, 
serves a greater purpose than practically requiring women to remove their 
scarves: “Banning the headscarf or veil is a symbolic gesture; for some 
European nations it is a way of taking a stand against Islam, declaring entire 
Muslim populations to be a threat to national integrity and harmony.”136 
Recalling Farmer’s definition of cultural violence as “inform[ing] the social 
machinery of oppression”137 and “stop[ping] individuals, groups, and societies 
from reaching their full potential,”138 France’s ban of conspicuous religious 
symbols in schools disproportionately prevents Muslim girls—relative to their 
religious groups—from reaching their full potential in school. 
The French law explicitly applies to primary and high school education. 
However, in recent years, more French politicians have called for the 
exclusion of Muslim women from universities, or even a general 
criminalization of hijab: 
Mainstream politicians on the right, including former President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, are calling for veiled women to be barred from 
universities. Others in Mr. Sarkozy’s party want to see women 
who cover their faces in public brought up on felony charges. On 
the left, a small party has pushed for a law stopping veiled 
women from working in day care centers with government 
contracts. Even in President François Hollande’s Socialist 
government, Pascale Boistard, the junior minister for women’s 
 
135  See Walterick, supra note 102. For example, one French Muslim schoolgirl was sent home because 
her skirt was “too long,” which the school president thought it was too outwardly religious. Alissa J. Rubin, 
French School Deems Teenager’s Skirt an Illegal Display of Religion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/world/europe/french-school-teenagers-skirt-illegal-display-
religion.html. In the article, Rubin also notes that cases like this are becoming more frequent, and that “[t]he 
cases often involve skirt length, she said, but schools have also objected to sweaters or to headbands that they 
say are too broad and are meant to evoke head scarves.” Id. 
136  SCOTT, supra note 108, at 3. It is also important to note that, in French public discourse surrounding 
this issue, headscarves (which typically cover only the hair of the wearer) and veils or burqas (which cover 
the face of the wearer) are conflated. This allows for the convenience rhetoric of “safety”—i.e., how can we 
trust someone whose face is covered?—to be applied to inappropriate situations—for example, when a 
schoolgirl chooses to cover only her hair in a headscarf. 
137  Farmer, An Anthropology of Structural Violence, supra note 57, at 307. 
138  Farmer, Structural Violence and Clinical Medicine, supra note 56. 
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rights, said in January that she was “not sure that the veil had a 
place at the university level.” 139 
The drafters of CEDAW understood that access to education and employment 
were vital for women’s economic security,140 and, because these policies 
specifically exclude women from or restrict women’s access to work and 
education, they constitute a violation of CEDAW. 
2. Justification and Perpetuation of Violence per General 
Recommendations 12 and 19 
By examining these issues seemingly unrelated to direct violence 
through such a lens, General Recommendation 19 allows us to examine 
theoretically non-violent practices—forms of structural and cultural 
violence—and their relationship to direct violence against women. If the 
Committee’s definition of gender-based violence as “a form of discrimination 
that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis 
of equality with men”141 stands, the disproportionate impact of ideological 
backlash to anti-veil laws appears to meet that definition. 
Hijab suppression laws justify and perpetuate direct violence in a 
number of ways. First, when lawmakers use the rhetoric of “safety” and 
“extremism” to justify these kinds of policies, they perpetuate a fundamentally 
harmful assumption: Muslim women do not fit into the established or ideal 
national identity and are, therefore, dangerous.142 Attacks based on this kind 
of rhetoric occur even where a woman is lawfully permitted to wear her hijab 
in a given situation.143 Second, a woman runs the risk of physical violence in 
places where she acts in defiance of laws governing her manner of dress—
whether her defiance is intentional or unintentional. When direct violence is 
the result of a systematic attempt to “other” or dehumanize a group, the 
violence is often blamed on the victim.144 This concept is noticeably present 
 
139  Daley & Rubin, supra note 101. 
140  CEDAW, supra note 7. 
141  Id. at 1. 
142  Galtung, supra note 54, at 291. 
143  SCOTT, supra note 108, at 178 (discussing instances where women in hijab are denied services under 
the mistaken belief that the hijab is actually illegal to wear at all). 
144  Galtung, supra note 54, at 298. 
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here—direct violence asserted against Muslim women is blamed on their 
choice to wear hijab, rather than the choice made by the aggressors to engage 
in direct violence in the first place. These instances of physical violence come 
from a multitude of sources, from teachers who think a girl should not be 
veiled,145 to a police officer grabbing a woman’s scarf off in the street,146 to 
attacks from both men who believe women should be veiled and men who 
believe women should not be veiled.147 For the purpose of this analysis, 
violence from ideologically-motivated attacks inspired by inflammatory 
rhetoric and violence from the actual enforcement of the policy itself—
whether by police or vigilantes—are distinct concepts. 
 Post-hijab ban physical violence was widely documented in Soviet 
Uzbekistan. The rhetoric that veiled women were unempowered, un-Soviet, 
and “backwards” and the policies of unveiling women even at a significant 
cost, again, “set [the stage] for . . . direct violence, which is then blamed on 
the victim.”148 In this case, the victim is the woman who, whether veiled or 
unveiled, faced dire consequences for her decision, and ended up blamed 
either way. It is widely documented that both women who remained veiled 
and those who unveiled faced significant threats and were simply safer staying 
at home, although many did not.149 It is estimated that in 1928, 270 women in 
Uzbekistan were murdered for unveiling.150 This focus on the veil by the 
Soviets as a symbol of liberation failed to acknowledge the realities of the 
social structure in which they were operating: 
The hujum produced its own violent backlash. Women who 
unveiled challenged not just a dress code but the entire social and 
moral order that stood upon it. Many of them paid for the 
challenge with their lives. A spate of attacks targeted unveiled 
women, who were deemed to have brought shame and dishonor 
on their families, their neighbors, and Islam itself. Many were 
 
145  SCOTT, supra note 108, at 178. 
146  Tajikistan 2017/2018, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-
and-central-asia/tajikistan/report-tajikistan (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). 
147  Northrup, supra note 66, at 125. 
148  Galtung, supra note 54, at 298. 
149  Keller, supra note 76. 
150  “Ten years later, an article in the journal Antireligioznik estimated that 270 Uzbek women had been 
murdered in 1928 for unveiling.” Keller, supra note 76, at 26. 
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killed, others were raped, and many more wounded in vicious 
physical attacks.151 
This degree of backlash against women, some scholars argue, only abated 
several years later, but in that time resulted in the loss of thousands of lives, 
if not more.152 The Soviets had been warned about the likelihood of this kind 
of response, but failed to adjust their policies to reflect that likelihood: “The 
comparatively few indigenous Muslim communists, nearly all male, also 
generally lobbied for other priorities, often contending (accurately) that an 
attack on the veil and local forms of family life would backfire against the 
party.”153 However, it is worth noting that while Uzbek men focused their 
attention on opposing specifically the anti-hijab policy, women advocated for 
the Soviets to pursue other avenues of empowerment for women: “Some of 
these women favored legal reform to improve the status of Uzbek women, but 
others supported a focus on economic training, literacy work, and social 
welfare reform.”154 Veiled Uzbek women became the “dangerous it,”155 
representing the ills of Islam and religion that communism sought to eradicate. 
As such, it became appropriate, even necessary to exert direct violence in this 
situation, in order to “protect” both women and society from the evils of 
religion.156 These facts, taken together, suggest that the Soviets may have been 
able to avoid most physically violent opposition to their policies had they 
focused substantive aspects of women’s liberation—employment, education, 
etc.—rather than symbolic representations such as the veil. 
Ideologically motivated backlash has been clearly documented in the 
French context. As the only country where Muslims constituted a minority at 
the time of the policy in question,157 Muslim women are more clearly “other” 
in France than they were in Soviet Uzbekistan or are in Tajikistan, where 
 
151  KHALID, supra note 76, at 80. 
152  Keller, supra note 76, at 25. 
153  Northrop, supra note 66. 
154  Id. at 121. 
155  Galtung, supra note 54, at 298. 
156  Id. at 291. 
157  As discussed previously, the Muslim population of France is estimated to be between 4.5 and 6 
million, out of a total population of 67 million. See Walder, supra note 97. The population of Central Asia in 
the 1920s was approximately 90% Muslim. Lawrence Martin, The World of Islam in 1923, 1 FOREIGN AFF. 
3, 138–39 (1923). Tajikistan’s population is approximately 97% Muslim. Tajikistan, CIA WORLDFACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/llibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ti.html. 
 
754 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 28 NO. 3 
   
 
Muslims constitute a majority of the population. Direct violence against 
Muslim women in France has been on the rise since the mid-2000s: 
[I]n 2013, 80% of anti-Muslim attacks in France were against 
women. Women wearing hijab or other visible clothing 
associated with Islam are particularly singled out for harassment 
and violence, often by men and increasingly in the aftermath of 
terrorist attacks in Europe. Against this backdrop of targeting of 
women in religious garb, any policy that links the burkini158 with 
terrorism puts Muslim women further in the crosshairs of 
Islamophobic violence.159 
In 2015, the New York Times interviewed French Muslim women after even 
more expansions on anti-veil laws.160 These women could not help but feel 
that the constant discussion about the way they dress opens them up to 
significant ideological backlash: 
[O]bservant Muslim women in France . . . say the constant talk 
of new laws has made them targets of abuse, from being spat at 
to having their veils pulled or being pushed when they walk on 
the streets. . . . In Toulouse recently, a pregnant mother wearing 
a head scarf had to be hospitalized after being beaten on the street 
by a young man who called her a “dirty Muslim.”161 
Muslim women in this situation are faced with an impossible choice: unveil, 
hopefully to avoid physical violence, or exercise bodily autonomy and 
religious beliefs by remaining veiled. Neither necessarily guarantees a 
woman’s safety.162 
 
158  “Burkini” is a portmanteau of “burqa” and “bikini,” and colloquially refers to a full-body swim suit, 
covering a woman’s entire body and the top of her head, as does a hijab. Adam Taylor, The Surprising 
Australian Origin Story of the Burkini, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Aug. 19, 2016), 
https://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/fashion/the-surprising-australian-origin-story-of-the-burkini-20160818-
gqvdu9.html. 
159  Jayne Huckerby, France’s Burkini Bans Put Muslim Women in Danger, TIME (Aug. 24, 2016), 
http://time.com/4463743/frances-burkini-bans/. 
160  Daley, supra note 101. 
161  Id. 
162  Compare Northrup, supra note 66, at 125 (describing an instance where a woman who had recently 
taken off her scarf was strangled by her husband), with Daley, supra note 101. 
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The rhetoric behind these policies emboldens those who may 
previously have silently harbored prejudices to act on them. In her book 
Politics of the Veil, Joan Wallach Scott rigorously examines what about the 
veil seems so vexing to the French: 
The veil’s disturbing connotation for French observers stemmed 
from its significance in a system of gender relations they took to 
be entirely different from their own . . . It is a recognition of the 
threat sex poses for society and politics. . . . [S]ex poses a 
tremendous difficulty for the abstract individualism that is the 
basis for French republicanism: if we are all the same, why has 
sexual difference been such an obstacle to real equality? . . . 
Islam’s insistence on recognizing the difficulties posed by 
sexuality revealed more than republicans wanted to see about the 
limits of their own system.163  
The choice to wear the veil is, at its core, no different than the choice to wear 
short skirts, but, for the French, the latter symbolizes liberation, and the former 
oppression.164 In this sense, “the tyranny of this fashion was not liberating . . 
. [and some critics] questioned the superiority of ‘open’ to ‘covered’ ways of 
dressing: ‘Can our bras, ties, pants, miniskirts, underwear and bathing suits all 
be so easily arrayed on one side or another of the divide’ between freedom 
and captivity?’”165 All this is to suggest that the French struggle deeply with 
any dichotomy between the sexes, understanding any acknowledgement of 
difference as an affront to their secular, republican system of government.166 
All of these laws, excepting Uzbekistan, are facially neutral in their 
enforcement. France restricts all “conspicuous religions symbols”167 and 
Tajikistan ostensibly restricts all non-traditional clothing.168 However, in both 
of these facially neutral cases, the laws are disproportionately enforced against 
veiled Muslim women, likely because of their conspicuousness.169 Amnesty 
 
163  SCOTT, supra note 101, at 154. 
164  Id. at 161. 
165  Id. 
166  Id. 
167  See French law, supra note 98. 
168  See Tajik law, supra note 122. 
169  See FANON, supra note 1, at 37. 
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International reported the following incidents the same month that the Tajik 
President signed the aforementioned law: 
[P]olice and local officials approached over 8,000 women who 
were wearing the Islamic headscarf (hijab) in public places, 
ordered them to remove it because it was against the law and 
asked them instead to wear a headscarf tied behind the head in 
the “traditional Tajik way.” Dozens of women were briefly 
detained, many had their hijabs forcibly removed. Women 
wearing western-style dress were not targeted. Government 
officials claimed that the hijab was a form of “alien culture and 
tradition” and a sign of “extremism”. Shops selling Islamic 
clothing were raided by security forces and many were forced to 
close.170 
Key in this report is the phrase “[w]omen wearing western-style dress were 
not targeted.”171 Hijab here seems a convenient target: it is public, relatively 
easily definable, and impacts a specific segment of the population. If the 
country were to implement the law as written and also target “western-style 
dress,” the reach would likely be much too broad to be implemented, and 
would require extensive definitions of what constitutes “western-style dress.” 
Muslim women in this case were targeted because of assumed extremist 
sympathies, as described in this report from the U.S. Department of State:  
[R]eferences to “alien culture and traditions” had become a 
government euphemism for the wearing of hijabs . . . [The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs] would detain women in hijabs and 
would investigate whether their husbands were Salafists,172 
because the Sughd MIA173 had determined all Salafist wives 
 
170  AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 146. 
171  Id. 
172  The term “Salafits” is generally used to refer to a group that, most importantly for this analysis, it 
one that “believes that violent jihad is fard ‘ayn (a personal religious duty).” Seth G. Jones, A Persistent 
Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists, RAND CORP. (2014), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR637/RAND_RR637.pdf. 
173  Referring to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Sughd region. Structure, MINISTRY OF INTERNAL 
AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN, http://mvd.tj/index.php/en/leadership/structure (last visited Feb. 
26, 2019). 
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wore hijabs. [P]olice officers had conducted approximately 40 
raids since the beginning of the year in bazaars and shopping 
points and had registered 643 women (i.e., put their names on a 
list maintained by the government) for wearing the hijab.174 
It is important to note here that headscarf bans are an ineffective tool with 
which to eradicate extremism: “[I]t is impossible to do away with a social 
phenomenon of radicalism by avoiding seeing it . . . [B]ans are seen as attacks 
to one’s identity. They seem to be disproportionate measures to assure the 
envisioned aims, introducing violence and running the risk to stir more 
reaction in the long term.”175 Not only, therefore, are these bans ineffective at 
achieving their purported goal, but may in fact exacerbate the problem, all the 
while violating CEDAW in the process. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
None of the three laws examined here look exactly the same. The 
Soviets in the 1920s sought to eradicate all religion and impose atheism—it 
just so happens that in Uzbekistan, Muslim women were among the more 
identifiably religious. The French from the late 1980s through the 2000s 
intended not necessarily to eradicate religion, but aimed to keep religion, or 
Islam specifically, as hidden as possible. Tajikistan—the most recent, with 
passage in 2017—ostensibly cared very little about the religion of the people 
it effected; the government sought only to reconstruct a Tajik national 
identity, free of outside influences.  
 In their attempts to homogenize their populations and craft a specific 
national identity, political leaders put Muslim women in danger. By 
advancing polices relying on harmful rhetoric projecting Muslim women as 
dangerous representatives of a religion to be feared, states effectively incite 
others—police and citizens alike—to commit direct violence against women. 
Restricting women’s access to education and the workforce significantly 
limits their ability to engage and participate in society. The United Nations, in 
 
174  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT FOR 2016, TAJIKISTAN, 
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/ rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=268944#wrapper. 
175  Ioanna Tourkochoriti, The Burka Ban: Divergent Approaches to Freedom of Religion in France and 
in the U.S.A., 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 791, 848 (2012). 
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adopting CEDAW, attempted to curb laws and policies stifling women, and 
these policies exist in clear defiance of these principles.  
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Appendix 1 
Variations in Islamic dress for women176 
 
Appendix 2 
Example of Tajik traditional headcovering. On the left is an example of a non-traditional headcovering for 
a Tajik woman; on the right, the traditional method.177  
 
 
 
176  Lucy Fahey, What Are the Differences Between the Burka, Niqab, and Hijab?, ABC NEWS 
(AUSTRALIA) (Jan. 13, 2017, 7:51 PM), available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-02/what-are-the-
differences-between-the-burka,-niqab-and-hijab/5785816. 
177  Najibullah, supra note 130. 
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Below is a side view of the traditional Tajik headcovering. 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Triangulation of violence178 
 
 
178  Framework as described by Galtung, supra note 54, at 291–305. 
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Appendix 4 
 
  
 Cultural violence 
(rhetoric) 
Structural violence 
(laws/policies) 
Direct violence 
(force) 
Uzbekistan Rhetoric of Muslim 
women as oppressed or 
not Soviet enough 
State-sponsored 
unveilings 
Violence against both veiled 
and unveiled women 
France Women with hijab 
described as security 
concern, threat to French 
secularity, representation 
of Islamic extremism 
Law forcing schoolgirls 
to remove hijab while in 
public schools and in the 
course of public 
employment; 
additionally, laws 
outlawing the burqa 
Physical attacks against 
Muslims are 
disproportionately perpetrated 
against Muslim women, 
forcible unveilings by police, 
teachers, etc. 
Tajikistan Veils as a “modern 
negative influence,” 
suggestion that women 
who wear hijab are not 
respectful of national 
identity 
Policies regulating 
women’s dress and other 
Islamic traditions 
Detention of veiled women, 
forcible removal of veils 
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